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We investigate simultaneous and sequential price competition in duopoly markets with dif-
ferentiated products. In both markets symmetric …rms are repeatedly and randomly matched.
The strategy method is used to elicit behavior in the sequential market. We …nd that average
leader prices in the sequential market are higher than average prices in the simultaneous market,
just as predicted by the theory, whereas average follower prices are not above average prices in
the simultaneous market, in contrast to the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, second movers
gain from the sequential structure in comparison to simultaneous-move markets whereas …rst
movers do not. As in theory, there is a signi…cant …rst–mover disadvantage when …rms decide
sequentially. Finally, to assess the robustness of our …ndings, we report the results of control
treatments varying the matching scheme and the mode of eliciting choices (strategy method vs.
standard sequential play).
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While in a simultaneous–move duopoly …rms decide upon their strategic variables (e.g., quantity
or price) at the same time, in a sequential–move duopoly one …rm can commit to an action …rst.
The other …rm, or second mover, is assumed to decide after observing the action of the …rst mover.
The timing of decisions has a pronounced e¤ect on the market outcome. Consider for example
two symmetric …rms facing linear demand. In a homogeneous market with quantity competition
the following holds: First, total quantity (as well as consumers’ and total welfare) is higher in the
market with sequential moves. Second, in the market with sequential moves, there is a …rst–mover
advantage as the …rst mover earns higher pro…ts than the second mover. Third, both the individual
quantity and pro…t of the …rst mover (second mover) is higher (lower) as compared to individual
quantities and pro…ts in the simultaneous–move duopoly.1
Now consider a market with heterogeneous products and price competition where …rms set
prices either simultaneously or sequentially. In the sequential–move market both …rms set higher
prices than in the simultaneous–move market implying higher pro…ts and lower consumer rent in the
sequential market. (It can be argued that this property makes Stackelberg equilibria more plausible
with heterogeneous than with homogeneous goods as both …rms pro…t from the sequential-move
structure.) Moreover, in the market with sequential moves, there is a …rst–mover disadvantage as
the …rst mover earns a lower pro…t in the subgame–perfect outcome. The latter observation is due
to the fact that reaction curves in a heterogeneous market are upward–sloping when products are
substitutes (see Gal-Or, 1985, Dowrick, 1986, and Boyer and Moreaux, 1987).
Our study addresses the experimental comparison of simultaneous and sequential duopoly
markets with price competition where products are imperfect substitutes. To the best of our
knowledge this study is the …rst reporting experimental results of such a sequential duopoly market
and comparing them with behavior in simultaneous duopoly markets. There are, however, a number
of studies on simultaneous play in markets with di¤erentiated products, for example Dolbear et al.
(1968), Harstad, Martin and Normann (1998) and Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2000).2
1Huck, Müller and Normann (2001a) report on an experiment designed to compare simultaneous and sequential
play on a homogeneous duopoly market with quantity competition. They …nd that in sequential duopolies, aggregate
output is in fact higher than in simultaneous duopolies. Hence, not only theory, but also experiments seem to suggest
that in this case a sequential market structure is bene…cial for welfare. Moreover, although …rst movers do not exploit
their …rst–mover advantage as strongly as predicted, …rst movers earn higher pro…ts than second movers.
2In addition, there is an experimental literature studying games with a unique survivor of iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies, just as the simultaneous-move market we investigate. Overall, it emerges that the
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A famous example of sequential price setting is the U.S. cigarette industry during the late
1920s and early 1930s. The largest seller of cigarettes, Reynolds, acted as the price leader. Between
1923 and 1941 eight price changes occurred, and Reynolds led six of them. Its price changes were
followed immediately by other cigarette companies.3 Another example is the German market for
dye producers who matched an announced price increase for a range of related products.4 Examples
of price leadership also include markets for di¤erentiated products such as the automobile industry
in the U.S. after 1950 and the U.S. market for ready-to-eat-cereals.5 Evaluating the case studies
Scherer and Ross (1990) argue that “price leadership tends to (...) increase prices on average (...)”
(p.261), as predicted by the model that we have tested experimentally.
In theory, duopolistic price leadership has been investigated both for the case of homo-
geneous (Deneckere and Kovenock, 1992) and the case of heterogeneous products (Furth and
Kovenock, 1993). Deneckere and Kovenock, covering the case of capacity-constrained duopolists
producing a homogenous good, review the properties of the simultaneous-move game (including
the well-known Bertrand-paradox result) and—extending previous work by Shubik and Levitan
(1980)—examine the equilibria obtained in the case where the large …rm is a price leader as well as
in the case in which the small …rm is a price leader. However, their main concern is to determine
conditions under which one of the …rms endogenously becomes a price leader. More relevant for
our study is the work by Furth and Kovenock (1993) who consider duopolistic price-leadership
with capacity constraints and di¤erentiated products. Similarly to the paper by Deneckere and
Kovenock, the authors …rst characterize the equilibria with an exogenously speci…ed leader before
specifying capacity combinations that would lead to the endogenous emergence of price leadership
once the duopolists are given more ‡exibility with regard to the timing of decisions.
Other papers investigating the question how sequential moves of …rms can arise endoge-
nously, include for example, Ono (1978, 1982), Anderson (1987), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) or
van Damme and Hurkens (1998). Ono (1978, 1982) determines the preference of a …rm to be a
leader or a follower in a model in which the leader …rm is a price setter whereas the follower …rm
is a price taker deciding how much to produce at the given price. Anderson (1987) shows that the
subjects’ ability or propensity to play iteratively undominated strategies is limited. (See in particular Rapoport and
Amaldoss (2000), Capra,Goeree, Gomez, and Holt (1999 and 2000), and, most relevant for our work, Dufwenberg
and Gneezy (2000) who study an experimental Bertrand market with homogeneous goods.)
3See Scherer and Ross (1990), p.250f.
4See Markert (1974).
5See Scherer and Ross (1990), p.254-258.
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introduction of spatial competition provides a means of endogenizing the role of price leadership.
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) analyze games in which …rms have to choose both an action (quantity
or price—thus covering both the homogenous as well as the heterogenous goods case) and the date
of the action.6 Finally, van Damme and Hurkens (1998) study Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous
timing game with price-setting …rms and use risk-dominance considerations to show that the low
cost …rm will most likely emerge as the endogenous price leader.7
In our experiment subjects were repeatedly and randomly rematched to play one of the two
market games. In the treatment with simultaneous play, both players in a market set one price in
each period. In the treatment with sequential play, we employ the so-called strategy method by
asking all players to submit a strategy. Thus, the …rst mover decides upon a single price whereas
the second mover is asked to specify a complete response function in each period.
Regarding the experimental results, we …nd that in both treatments median prices exactly
converge to the game-theoretic predictions. However, this is not the case with regard to observed
mean prices. In the market with simultaneous play the mean price is above the equilibrium predic-
tion whereas in the treatment with sequential play the …rst and the second movers’ average price
is lower than predicted. Moreover, whereas …rst movers in the sequential market set on average
higher prices than …rms in the simultaneous markets, second movers do not. Nevertheless, as in
theory, we …nd a signi…cant …rst-mover disadvantage. It turns out that second movers gain from
the sequential structure in comparison to simultaneous-move markets whereas …rst movers do not.
Finally, second movers’ average response function has the same intercept but a slightly greater
slope than predicted.
To check whether these …ndings are robust, we conducted a number of additional treatments.
First, we investigated whether truly sequential play leads to di¤erent results than our baseline
treatment where second mover behavior is elicited using the strategy method. Second, we varied
the matching procedure to study the e¤ect of repeated interaction of …xed pairs of subjects on the
market outcome. In short, we …nd that with truly sequential play and …xed matching our main
results are corroborated. However, if the strategy method is combined with …xed matching, none of
6For experimental evidence on endogenous timing in homogenous markets with quantity competition see Huck,
Müller and Normann (2001b).
7Also, demand uncertainty can make the large …rm change its price …rst, because it is the …rst to detect a shift
in market demand, making it the price leader (see Eckard, 1982). Similarly, customer loyalty can be the source of
endogenous sequential moves when …rms set prices (see Deneckere, Kovenock, and Lee, 1992).
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the theoretical predictions regarding di¤erences in individual prices and pro…ts in the two markets
hold.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the market games, experimental
procedures, and hypotheses. Section 3 reports the experimental results and section 4 summarizes
and concludes.
2 Markets, procedures and hypotheses
In a series of experiments, we study two heterogeneous duopoly markets with price competition.
The two markets di¤er with regard to the timing of decisions. In the …rst market …rms decide
simultaneously upon prices. In the second market …rms choose their prices sequentially: the …rst
mover, player 1, decides upon his price p1; then—knowing p1—the second mover, player 2, decides
upon his price p2.
Participants received a payo¤ table (Table 6 in the Appendix) showing all possible combi-
nations of prices and corresponding pro…ts. The numbers given in the payo¤ table were measured
in a …ctitious currency unit called “Taler”. Assuming zero production costs, the raw payo¤ ta-
ble was generated according to the pro…t functions ¼i(pi; pj) = pi ¢ qi(pi; pj) where qi(pi; pj) =
maxf16¡ 2pi+pj ; 0g; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: However, we manipulated a number of entries in the payo¤
table in order to get unique equilibria and to separate equilibrium strategies for the simultaneous-
moves and the sequential market, and the collusive action.8 Each …rm could choose a price from
the set f1; 2; :::; 10g:9 In the …nal payo¤ table, there is a unique equilibrium with regard to simulta-
neous play, a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium with regard to sequential play and unique joint
pro…t maximizing prices as given in Table 1. This table also shows the pro…ts implied by these
predictions.
8Due to the discreteness of the strategy space, typically multiple equilibria arise (see Holt, 1985), which we avoided
by changing some payo¤s. Also note that the demand functions speci…ed above have the property that the quantity
demanded decreases when both prices increase by one unit, which limits the players’ ability to earn high collusive
pro…ts. However, the larger the negative coe¢cient of the rival’s price, the ‡atter the best reply functions and the
closer the equilibrium strategies in both market games get. The above parameterization strikes a compromise between
these two issues.
9The prices 1, 2, ...,10 given in the payo¤ table correspond to the prices 2, ..., 11 in the underlying market. However,
for the experiment we wanted to use a more prominent range of numbers. Therefore, we shifted the numbers one





pi = 4 p1 = 6; p2 = 5 pi = 8
Pro…ts ¼i = 53 ¼1 = 58; ¼2 = 68 ¼i = 65
Table 1: Theoretical predictions
The computerized10 experiments were conducted at Humboldt University in June 2000 and
in January and May 2001. Upon arrival in the lab, subjects (undergraduate as well as graduate
students mostly of economics or business administration) were assigned a computer screen and
received written instructions. After reading them, questions could be asked in private. 12 subjects
participated in each session, and all sessions consisted of 15 rounds.
The natural way of implementing a game with sequential moves is to let subjects choose
sequentially. However, some information sets may be reached seldom. In order to get more in-
formation about the behavior of second movers in the market with sequential play (treatment
SeqRand), we employed the so-called strategy method by simultaneously asking all players for
decisions at every information set. Thus, in each of the 15 rounds the …rst mover had to specify a
single price whereas the second mover was asked to name a price for each of the possible prices of
the …rst mover.
We conducted three sessions for treatment SeqRand. At the beginning of each session,
the subjects were randomly assigned to be …rst or second mover and these roles were kept …xed
during the entire experiment. In each round players of di¤erent roles were randomly matched with
each other. This was known to the subjects. Starting in the second round, the decision screen also
showed the results of one’s own pair in the previous round, that is, the price of the …rst mover, the
relevant11 price of the second mover and the implied payo¤s for both players.12 The decision screen
10We used the software tool kit z-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (1999).
11The relevant price of the second mover is the price he or she chose at the information set corresponding to the
price of the …rst mover.
12We chose to give players detailed feedback to facilitate learning. However, it remains an open question how this
a¤ects the market outcome. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2000) …nd that in experimental Bertrand markets with
di¤erentiated products and …xed groups of four …rms, giving the players more information leads to more competition.
They compare a treatment where players are informed about aggregate prices and pro…ts of the previous round to
a treatment with information about individual prices and pro…ts. Note that in our duopoly framework, these two
treatments are essentially identical.
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of second movers also showed the strategy submitted in the previous round. (In this treatment the
…rms were labelled A (…rst mover) and B (second mover).)
For the markets with simultaneous play (treatment SimRand) no labels were assigned to
…rms. The instructions simply used the words “you” and “the other …rm”. We conducted two
sessions for treatment SimRand. For the sake of comparison with treatment SeqRand, we used
the following matching procedure in treatment SimRand: At the start of each session the 12
subjects were divided into two groups of six subjects each. Duopoly markets were then created
in each round by randomly matching two subjects from di¤erent groups. This was known to the
subjects. After each round subjects got individual feedback about what happened in their own
market, i.e., next to a subject’s own price the feedback screen displayed the price of the other
subject and the implied individual payo¤s. The behavior in treatments SimRand and SeqRand
will serve as a benchmark.
In addition, we conducted four control treatments. First, we checked whether the strategy
method used in the afore-mentioned treatment SeqRand induces di¤erent behavior than truly
sequential play. On the one hand, the strategy method can reveal more information about the
motivations of a single subject than standard sequential play. On the other hand, as Roth (1995,
322-323) puts it: “The obvious disadvantage is that it [the strategy method] removes from exper-
imental observation the possible e¤ects of the timing of decisions in the course of the game.” To
test for the presence of such e¤ects we conducted two sessions of the sequential-move market with
followers submitting their prices after observing the leader’s decision (treatment TrSeqRand).
Here the same matching scheme was used as in SimRand and SeqRand. Second, the e¤ect of
…xed matching on the nature of prices and pro…ts was tested. From a game-theoretic point of
view, random matching seems to be appropriate as it resembles most closely the one-shot nature
of a game, at the same time allowing subjects to gain experience. But from the point of view of
industrial organization, it seems more natural to let …xed pairs of subjects play the game repeat-
edly. Therefore, one session with …xed pairs was conducted for each order of moves (treatment
SimFix and treatment SeqFix (which again employed the strategy method)). To complete the
design matrix, we also ran one treatment of the sequential market game with …xed pairs in the truly
sequential mode (TrSeqFix). Thus, in this treatment we check for the e¤ect of the simultaneous
change of both the matching scheme and the mode of eliciting choices on behavior in the sequential
market.
Subjects were informed that, at the end of the experiment, three of the …fteen rounds
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would be randomly selected in order to determine the actual monetary pro…t in German marks.
The latter was computed by using an exchange rate of 10:1. Before the …rst round started, subjects
were asked to answer a control question (which was checked) in order to make sure that everybody
fully understood the payo¤ table. Altogether 10 £ 12 = 120 di¤erent subjects participated in the
experiments. Sessions lasted about 50 minutes and the subjects earned on average DM 17.00.
Summarizing the theoretical predictions one should expect
Hypothesis 1 The average price in treatment Sim is lower than the average price of both the …rst
and the second mover in treatment Seq, that is, (a) pSim < pSeq1 ; and (b) p
Sim < pSeq2 : Also, the
average price of the second mover is smaller than the average price of the …rst mover in treatment
Seq, that is, (c) pSeq2 < p
Seq
1 :
Hypothesis 2 Average …rm pro…ts in treatment Sim are lower than both the …rst and the second
mover’s average pro…t in treatment Seq, that is, (a) ¼Sim < ¼Seq1 ; and (b) ¼
Sim < ¼Seq2 : Further-
more, in treatment Seq there is a …rst-mover disadvantage, that is, (c) ¼Seq1 < ¼
Seq
2 :
Hypothesis 3 Industry pro…ts in treatment Sim are lower than industry pro…ts in treatment Seq,
that is, (¼1+ ¼2)Sim < (¼1+ ¼2)Seq:
Hypothesis 4 Second movers in treatment Seq learn to choose the best response (function).
Note that we maintain the hypotheses independent of the matching procedure (Rand or
Fix) and the design of the sequential game (Seq or TrSeq). Note, furthermore, that Hypothesis
3 is derived directly from Hypothesis 2.
3 Experimental results
The results are reported in two subsections. Section 3.1 reports the results of the sessions with
random matching whereas section 3.2 reports the results of the sessions with …xed matching. Within
each section we …rst test the above hypotheses by comparing results from the simultaneous-move
markets with results from the sequential-move markets employing the strategy method. Then we
examine which e¤ect the mode of soliciting choices of second movers (strategy method vs. truly
sequential play) has on prices in the sequential markets.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for all six treatments both for all rounds and for the last
…ve rounds. In the sequential treatments, the …rst number denotes the …rst mover’s price, followed
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by the second mover’s price. Note that the variability in observed prices decreases over time in
most treatments as standard deviations (shown in parentheses in Table 2) are usually lower in the
last …ve rounds than in all rounds. More detailed information for all treatments is given in Tables 7
and 8 (in the appendix) where medians and mean prices along with standard deviations are shown
for each period.
In the following, we will work with data from the last …ve rounds. To test for signi…cance of
the di¤erence in means, we ran linear regressions across mean prices or pro…ts, using the treatment
(Sim vs. Seq) or the player’s position (…rst vs. second mover within Seq treatments) as a dummy.
For example, to test part (a) of Hypothesis 1 we use the estimation equation p = ¯0+¯1Dummy+"i
where the variable Dummy is equal to zero in treatment Sim and equal to one in treatment
Seq. The estimate for ¯1 can be directly interpreted as the di¤erence in means. "i is a normally
distributed error term with mean zero and variance ¾2i . We use White (1980) robust standard errors
adjusted for possible non-independence of observations within markets to estimate the covariance
matrix.13
Table 3 provides a synopsis of the test results indicating the respective levels of signi…cance.
These results will be elaborated on in the following.
3.1 Random Matching
3.1.1 Strategy Method
Regarding the above hypotheses and comparing the results of the baseline treatments SimRand
and SeqRand, we make the following observations:
Hypothesis 1: The mean price in treatment SimRand (4.66) is signi…cantly lower than the
mean price of the …rst mover in treatment SeqRand (5.28). This provides support for Hypothesis
1, part (a). However, the mean price in treatment SimRand is slightly higher than the mean price
13Taking the possible dependence within clusters (markets) into account implies that homoskedasticity cannot be



















where X is the matrix of regressors, N the number of observations, M the number of clusters Gm (markets), k the
number of regressors, um =
P
j2Gmb"jxj; b"j = yj ¡ xj b̄; yj is the dependent variable for observation j; xj the vector
of independent variables for observation j, and b̄ are the coe¢cient estimates. This procedure is implemented in the
cluster option for linear regressions of the STATA package. See STATA Corp. (1999, vol. 3, pp.156-158 and 178-179)
and Rogers (1993).
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Table 2: Aggregate data. (Only relevant prices for second movers.)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.10
Hypothesis Random Matching Fixed Matching
Seqrand TrSeqrand Seqfix TrSeqfix
1 (a) pSim < pSeq1 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤¤ – –
1 (b) pSim < pSeq2 – – – –
1 (c) pSeq1 > p
Seq
2 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤¤ – ¤ ¤ ¤
2 (a) ¼Sim < ¼Seq1 – – – –
2 (b) ¼Sim < ¼Seq2 ¤¤ ¤¤ – ¤ ¤ ¤
2 (c) ¼Seq1 < ¼
Seq




– ¤¤ – ¤¤
4 Resp. Function X X X (X)
Table 3: Synopsis of the hypotheses and the test results.
Note: *** resp. ** indicates (one-tailed) signi…cance at the 1 resp. 5% level whereas “–” indicates that the
respective hypothesis was rejected. The symbol “X” indicates that the empirical response function
(almost) coincides with the best reply function.
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of the second mover in treatment SeqRand (4.66 vs. 4.51) which immediately rejects part (b)
of Hypothesis 1. Finally, the di¤erence in average prices of …rst and second movers in treatment
SeqRand has the predicted sign and is statistically signi…cant which supports part (c) of Hypothesis
1.
Hypothesis 2: Refer to Table 2 again. Average pro…ts in treatment SimRand are slightly
higher than …rst mover pro…ts in treatment SeqRand (55.72 vs. 55.01), which is the reverse of
the theoretical prediction. However, average pro…ts in treatment SimRand are signi…cantly lower
than average pro…ts of second movers in treatment SeqRand (55.72 vs. 60.22), thus con…rming
part (b) of Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, the di¤erence between …rst and second movers’ pro…ts in
the last …ve rounds (55.01 vs. 60.22) is not as pronounced as theory predicts (58 vs. 68). However,
it is statistically signi…cant. Hence, there is a signi…cant …rst-mover disadvantage in treatment
SeqRand—just as predicted.
Hypothesis 3: A comparison of the sum of …rms’ pro…ts under the sequential move structure
with the case of simultaneous moves yields (¼1 + ¼2)SimRand < (¼1+ ¼2)
SeqRand (as 111:44 <
115:23) meaning that two …rms jointly bene…t from the sequential move structure, just as predicted.
However, this di¤erence is not signi…cant.
Hypothesis 4: Figure 1 shows both the best response function and the empirical response
function (based on averages of the last …ve rounds) for second movers in treatment SeqRand
(along with the response function of treatment SeqFix which will be discussed below). Second
movers aiming at pro…t maximization, as it is assumed in the derivation of the subgame-perfect
equilibrium, are supposed to react according to p2 = 3:067 + 0:261p1. (This is the result of a
linear regression estimation of the best-reply function for our discretized game.) We estimate the
empirical response function of second movers, p2 = °0 + °1p1, by linear regressions, including
dummy variables for subjects, periods and sessions. We coded the dummy variables such that both
the estimated intercept °0 and the estimated slope °1 shown in Table 4 represent actual averages.
14
According to Table 4, the empirical response of second movers in treatment SeqRand has
the same intercept as and a somewhat bigger slope than the best response function. As can be
seen from Figure 1, the empirical response function in treatment SeqRand more or less coincides
with the best response function for leaders’ prices up to 6. But for prices higher than the subgame-
perfect price of the …rst mover, second movers in the experiment set higher prices than theoretically
14We restrict the sum of the dummy coe¢cients to be equal to zero. See Suits (1984) for the use of restricted least


































Figure 1: Best and empirical response functions of second movers in treatments SeqRand and
SeqFix.
Estimating equation: p2 = °0 +°1p1












Table 4: Regression results.
Note: ¤¤¤ indicates signi…cance at the 1% level. Absolute value of asymptotic t-statistics in
parentheses.
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predicted. Thereby, second movers would decrease their own pro…t slightly and increase the pro…t
of …rst movers at a much higher rate, resulting in a reduced payo¤ gap (see the payo¤ table (Table
6) in the Appendix). As it turns out, …rst movers almost never chose a price higher than 6 in
the last …ve rounds. This lack of “hard” feedback for all sampling points of their reply function
may explain the deviation of second movers from subgame-perfect behavior. Overall we …nd that
Hypothesis 4 is con…rmed whenever second movers get enough feedback. This positive result is
indicated by the symbol “X” in Table 3.
3.1.2 Standard Sequential Play
Now turn to the question whether the strategy method induces di¤erent behavior than standard
sequential play where the second mover chooses his price after having observed the …rst mover’s
price. Cursory inspection of Table 2 suggests that the results from standard sequential play are in
line with the results from the treatment using the strategy method. However, prices (and especially
the leader’s price) are slightly higher (and closer to the predicted values) when follower behavior is
elicited by truly sequential play. Overall, we …nd that the method of eliciting choices does not have
a strong impact on behavior under the random matching protocol. In fact, as Table 3 reveals we …nd
that the test results regarding Hypothesis 1 and 2 are very similar. That is, hypotheses that were
con…rmed [rejected] when individual behavior in treatment SimRand was compared to behavior in
treatment SeqRand are also con…rmed [rejected] if one compares individual behavior in treatments
SimRand with behavior in treatment TrSeqRand. However, Hypothesis 3 was rejected with
regard to the benchmark treatments, but is con…rmed when comparing the simultaneous markets
with the truly sequential markets: Industry pro…ts (i.e., the sum of …rm 1 and …rm 2’s pro…ts) are
signi…cantly lower when …rms move simultaneously (115.24 on average) than when …rms move in
standard sequential order (120.63 on average). Thus, the industry bene…ts from truly sequential
play compared to simultaneous price decisions.
As mentioned in the introduction, with truly sequential play some information sets may be
reached only seldom. In fact, during the last …ve rounds in treatment TrSeqRand virtually all
prices chosen by …rst movers were either 4 or 6. Therefore it is not meaningful to draw a picture of
the second movers’ empirical response function or to run a regression. Instead, Table 5 simply lists
the prices chosen by …rst movers, the number of times they were chosen, and the average response
by second movers (with standard deviations in parentheses) along with their optimal response.
Neglecting the single observation at p1 = 3; it turns out that the second movers’ reactions to prices
14





















Table 5: Followers’ responses in the truly sequential markets
of p1 = 4 or p1 = 6 were close to optimal, supporting Hypothesis 4.
3.2 Fixed matching
The composition of real markets does not follow a random pattern. Instead, …rms typically compete
with each other over a certain period of time. Therefore, we conducted three additional control
sessions to analyze …rm behavior with repeated interaction. Note that according to theory, the
equilibrium of the stage game should be played in each round, due to backward induction. Both
baseline treatments were run with …xed pairs (SimFix and SeqFix) as well as the market with
truly sequential moves (TrSeqFix). For a summary of the results refer to Table 2 again.
3.2.1 Strategy Method
Comparing the …xed-matching treatments with the corresponding random-matching treatments in
Table 2, we make the following three observations: (1) Behavior in treatment SimFix is more
collusive than in treatment SimRand as prices and pro…ts are higher in the former treatment
than in the latter, no matter whether medians or means are considered.15 (2) Comparing means
in treatments SeqFix and SeqRand, behavior is, by and large, not very di¤erent in the two
treatments.16 (3) Comparing means again, we …nd that behavior in treatment TrSeqFix is more
collusive than in treatment TrSeqRand as prices and pro…ts are higher in the former treatment
than in the latter.
15Note that there is a dramatic drop of median prices over time in treatment SimFix whereas the decline of mean
prices is moderate (see Table 8 in the Appendix).
16A notable exception is the fact that p1 and p2 di¤er signi…cantly in Seqrand, but not in Seqfix. This is
commented on below.
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Now turn to Hypothesis 1 to 4 for the …xed matching sessions. Observations (1) and (2)
have a dramatic e¤ect with regard to Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, as all of these predictions are rejected
when comparing behavior in treatments SimFix and SeqFix (see Table 3). In fact, the average
price in treatment SimFix (5.58) is higher than both the average leader price (5.13) and the average
follower price (4.97) in treatment SeqFix, immediately rejecting parts (a) and (b) of Hypothesis
1. And although the di¤erence between the leaders’ and the followers’ prices in treatment SeqFix
has the predicted sign, it is not signi…cant. These negative results regarding individual prices carry
over to individual pro…ts as all three predictions of Hypothesis 2 are rejected. Also, industry pro…ts
do not di¤er signi…cantly when …rms set prices simultaneously or sequentially (115.24 on average
for SimFix and 116.97 for SeqFix) rejecting Hypothesis 3. Next consider Hypothesis 4. Figure 1
shows the empirical response function (again based on averages of the last …ve rounds) for second
movers in treatment SeqFix. Apparently, it is quite similar to the one observed in treatment
SeqRand which might explain why behavior of …rst movers in these two treatments is not too
di¤erent from each other. However, the empirical response function in the treatment with …xed
matching lies slightly above the function in the treatment with random matching, as well as above
the best-response function. In fact, as Table 4 reveals, the intercept of the response function in
treatment SeqFix is slightly higher than in treatment SeqRand (3.202 vs. 3.002) whereas the
slope is about the same in both treatments (0.330 vs. 0.325). In all, it seems fair to conclude that
the empirical response function of treatment SeqFix is quite close to the best response function,
supporting Hypothesis 4.
3.2.2 Standard Sequential Play
Consider which results of the baseline random matching treatments continue to hold when matching
is …xed, but play is truly sequential (SimFix vs. TrSeqFix). It will emerge that the qualitative
results are similar to the results from the comparison of treatments SimRand and TrSeqRand.
Regarding Hypothesis 1, the …rms’ average price in the market with simultaneous price
choices (5.58 in SimFix) is lower than the price leaders’ average choice (6.33 in TrSeqFix), but
this di¤erence is not signi…cant: Furthermore, as in all other comparisons so far, the average price
in markets with simultaneous price decisions is higher than the average price of second movers in
the market with sequential decisions (5.58 vs. 5.50)—rejecting part (b) of Hypothesis 1. However,
the leaders’ average price is signi…cantly higher than followers’ prices (6.33 vs. 5.50), supporting
part (c) of Hypothesis 1. Concerning Hypothesis 2, we …nd a signi…cant …rst mover disadvantage
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in TrSeqFix (59:16 vs. 67:50); but again no signi…cant di¤erence between pro…ts in SimFix and
leader pro…ts in TrSeqFix. However, pro…ts in SimFix are signi…cantly lower than follower pro…ts
in the sequential market, just as predicted. Furthermore, industry pro…ts are signi…cantly higher in
TrSeqFix (126.6 on average) than in SimFix (115.24), supporting Hypothesis 3. Finally, only two
prices are chosen by …rst movers in the last …ve rounds in treatment TrSeqFix, namely the prices
p1 = 6 or p1 = 8: Interestingly, second movers react to the price p1 = 6 optimally by choosing
a price of p2 = 5 without any exception (see Table 5). In one of the six experimental markets
conducted, the …rst player always chose the collusive price of p1 = 8 in each of the last …ve rounds,
which was always matched with 8 by the second mover.
4 Summary and discussion
The experiments reported in this study were designed to compare simultaneous and sequential play
in heterogeneous duopoly markets when …rms are symmetric with respect to cost. We conducted
two baseline treatments, one with simultaneous and one with sequential price decisions. Subjects
in both markets were matched randomly across periods. In the sequential treatment, the so-called
strategy method was used, asking second movers to name a price for each of the possible prices of
the …rst mover.
We …nd that many of the qualitative predictions are con…rmed. More precisely, in the
baseline treatments Simrand and Seqrand observed median prices and pro…ts exactly match the
(subgame-perfect) equilibrium predictions. However, this is not true with regard to observed mean
prices and pro…ts. In treatment SimRand the mean price is higher than predicted, whereas in
treatment SeqRand the mean prices of the …rst and the second movers are lower than predicted.
Nevertheless, the average leader price in the sequential market is higher than the average price in
the simultaneous market, as predicted (Hypothesis 1 (a)). This does not hold with regard to the
average follower price, which is below the average price of the simultaneous market, contrary to
the prediction (Hypothesis 1 (b)). Furthermore, as in theory we …nd that leaders set on average
higher prices than followers (Hypothesis 1 (c)). As predicted there is a signi…cant …rst-mover
disadvantage in the sequential market (Hypothesis 2 (c)). Moreover, whereas second movers gain
from the sequential structure in comparison to simultaneous-move markets, …rst movers do not,
the latter …nding not being in line with theory (Hypothesis 2 (a) and (b)). Again as predicted,
we …nd that industry pro…ts in the sequential markets are higher than in simultaneous markets
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although these di¤erences fail to be statistically signi…cant (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we observe that
whenever second movers get enough feedback, they react as theory predicts (Hypothesis 4).
To test whether the strategy method induces behavior di¤erent from standard sequential
play, we conducted control sessions in which second movers chose their price after having observed
the …rst mover’s price. We …nd that the method of eliciting choices does not have a strong impact
on qualitative behavior under the random-matching protocol. The results regarding our hypotheses
remain the same with the exception that …rms do not only jointly gain from the sequential-move
structure, but that these gains are signi…cant. And prices are slightly higher (and closer to the
predicted values) when follower behavior is elicited by truly sequential play.
We also controlled for the e¤ect of the matching scheme on the results by implementing a
…xed-matching counterpart for each of the treatments mentioned above. We …nd that prices and,
therefore, pro…ts are higher in the simultaneous and sequential markets with truly sequential play
under the …xed-matching protocol as compared to random matching. However, this is not true
for the sequential market when the strategy method is employed. In this case, behavior under the
…xed-matching protocol is similar to behavior with random-matching. This has a marked e¤ect
on the hypothesis tests when comparing the simultaneous-move markets with the sequential-move
markets based on the strategy method: None of the hypotheses regarding prices and pro…ts …nd
support in the data. In contrast to the prediction, the average price in the simultaneous markets is
higher than both prices in the markets with sequential moves. Moreover, we …nd that the second
movers’ average response function (almost) does not vary across matching schemes if subjects are
asked to specify a complete reaction. Finally, the results from the hypothesis tests are almost the
same whether one compares simultaneous and truly sequential play under …xed matching or their
respective random-matching counterparts.
To sum up, the theoretical predictions do better in the treatments with random matching
than in the treatments with …xed matching when simultaneous markets are compared to sequential
markets employing the strategy method. In particular, prices in the market with simultaneous
moves are too high when …rms interact repeatedly. However, with …xed matching and standard
sequential play, a number of results from the random matching design continue to hold.
The slightly above-equilibrium prices in the simultaneous-move markets are in line with a
result of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) who report that prices in a homogeneous goods Bertrand
duopoly with random matching do not converge to the Nash equilibrium, but stay above the
equilibrium prediction. The result is, however, in contrast with previous experimental studies
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on duopoly markets with quantity competition which report convergence to the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium when subjects are repeatedly and randomly matched.17 A possible explanation for
our results could be that with heterogeneous products best reply functions are comparatively ‡at,
which makes deviations from the equilibrium price not very costly. It is then not too surprising
that deviations go into the direction where both payo¤s potentially increase, that is, towards more
collusive behavior.18
How can it be explained that in both sequential markets with random matching the average
price of …rst movers is lower than predicted? Inspecting …rst-mover data in these two treatments
more closely shows that in both treatments the choice of the equilibrium price of 6 and the choice
of a price of 4 account for the bulk of observations. In fact, in treatment SeqRand a price of 6
was chosen by …rst movers in 62.2% and a price of 4 in 30% of all cases in the last …ve rounds. In
treatment TrSeqRand these frequencies are 78% and 20%. And some subjects tend to choose 6
consistently while others choose 4 in most of the rounds.19 Thus, the observation that average prices
of …rst movers are below the equilibrium prediction in the sequential random-matching treatments
is caused by the fact that some …rst-movers choose a price of 4 rather than 6.20
Our …nding that behavior in the markets with …xed matching is overall (excluding treatment
SeqFix) more collusive than in the respective markets with random matching, is perfectly in line
with previous …ndings.21 Dolbear et al. (1968) also conducted simultaneous duopoly markets with
17See e.g., Fouraker and Siegel (1963), Holt (1985) and Huck, Müller and Normann (2001a).
18However, the experimental literature indicates that the number of competitors is crucial for the Bertrand market
outcome. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) …nd that prices converge to the equilibrium in three- and four-…rm Bertrand
markets with homogeneous goods, and Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2000) report convergence to equilibrium in
experimental four-…rm Bertrand markets with heterogeneous goods.
19In treatment SeqRand we …nd that 9 out of 18 or 50% of …rst movers chose the price of 6 in at least four of the
last …ve rounds. Furthermore, 4 out of 18 or 22.3% of …rst movers chose the price of 4 in at least four of the last …ve
rounds. In treatment TrSeqRand the picture is even more clear: 9 out of 12 or 75% of …rst movers choose the price
of 6 in at least four of the last …ve rounds whereas 2 out of 12 or 16.8% of …rst movers chose the price of 4 in at least
four of the last …ve rounds.
20One possible explanation for the …rst mover’s choice of a price of 4 is that some subjects might aim at implementing
equal payo¤s, assuming rationality of the second mover (which is warranted, given observed second-mover behavior).
That a price of 8 was never chosen could then be explained by fear from being exploited.
21Note that price leadership can be a means to achieve inter…rm coordination (see e.g., Scherer and Ross (1990) or
Phlips (1995) and the references therein) without explicitly resorting to direct communication between …rms. In a
repeated game, collusion can be sustained when price increases by the leading …rm are followed by price increases of
…rms moving later by the credible threat of a price war if one …rm deviates. However, our experimental results show
that with random matching, sequential price decisions did not move the markets away from the subgame-perfect
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di¤erentiated products and they, too, mainly report prices above the Nash equilibrium prediction
with a …xed matching protocol. Second, as mentioned in the introduction, Huck, Müller and
Normann (2001a) report on an experiment designed to compare simultaneous and sequential play
in a homogeneous duopoly market with quantity competition both under a random and a …xed-
matching scheme. They …nd that behavior is more collusive in both …xed-matching markets than
in the two random-matching markets.22 Taking this evidence together, it is interesting that we did
not observe more collusive behavior in treatment SeqFix than in treatment SeqRand. We found
that the average response function of second movers was very similar in both treatments. This
suggests that using the strategy method makes second-mover behavior less sensitive to a change in
the matching procedure.
Regarding the question whether a …rst mover disadvantage can be replicated in other exper-
imental markets, we would like to investigate a setting where demand is stochastic and followers can
learn from the decisions of leaders as in Gal-Or (1987). While information sharing in oligopoly has
been studied experimentally by Cason and Mason (1999), they only consider simultaneous moves
by …rms. It seems worthwhile to investigate how experimental subjects deal with the problem of
revealing information to their rival when they are in the position to move …rst.
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Appendix
1 Translated Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not talk to your neighbors
and be quiet during the entire experiment. If you have a question, give notice. We will answer your
questions privately.
In our experiment you can earn di¤erent amounts of money, depending on your behavior
and the behavior of other participants who are matched with you.
You play the role of a …rm which produces a similar product as another …rm in the market.
Both …rms have to make a single decision, namely which prices they want to set. In the attached
table, you can …nd each …rm’s pro…t resulting from every possible price constellation.
The table can be read as follows: the head of each row represents one …rm’s [in treatment
Seq: …rm A’s] price and the head of each column represents the price of the other …rm [in treatment
Seq: …rm B]. Inside the little box where row and column intersect, you can see your …rm’s […rm
A’s] pro…t at this combination of prices in the upper left corner and the other …rm’s […rm B’s] pro…t
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at these prices in the lower right corner. The pro…t is measured in a …ctitious currency which we
call Taler.
[This paragraph only in treatment Sim.] Both …rms make their pricing decisions simul-
taneously. This is repeated for 15 rounds. After every round you will be informed about your
pro…t and the other …rm’s price. You don’t know with which participant you serve the market. In
every new round you will be matched randomly with another participant in the following way: All
participants are divided into two groups of equal size and participants from one group are always
matched with participants from the other group.
[The following two paragraphs only in treatment Seq.] Now, turn to the question of how
to make a choice. When the experiment starts, you will be told on your computer screen whether
you are an A-…rm or a B-…rm. During the entire experiment you will keep this role. The procedure
is that the A-…rm always starts. This means that the A-…rm chooses its price (i.e. selects a row in
the table) and that the B-…rm is informed about the A-…rm’s choice. Knowing the price set by the
A-…rm, the B-…rm decides on its price (selects a column in the table). But this procedure will be
conducted in the following way: Instead of deciding one after the other, i.e. B-…rm after A-…rm,
the B-…rm determines the prices it wants to set for all possible prices that the A-…rm can set. By
the end of the round both …rms will be informed about the relevant price of the other …rm and
about their own pro…ts. This procedure corresponds to the one described above where the A-…rm
sets its price …rst followed by the B-…rm who decides on its price after being informed about the
A-…rm’s price decision.
This is repeated for 15 rounds. You don’t know with which participant you serve themarket.
In every new round you will be matched randomly with another participant such that an A-…rm
always meets a B-…rm. This means that if you are an A-…rm you will always be matched with a
B-…rm and vice versa.
This experiment is conducted on a computer. Full anonymity among participants and
between participants and the instructors will be kept since your decisions cannot be identi…ed with
your person.
Concerning the payment, note the following: At the end of the experiment 3 of the 15
rounds will be randomly chosen in to count for your …nal payment. The sum of your pro…ts in
Taler of (only) these 3 rounds determines your payment in DM. For each 10 Taler you earned during
these 3 rounds you will be paid 1 DM.
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Table 6: Payo¤ table
Note: The head of the row represents one …rm’s price and the head of the column represents the price of
the other …rm. Inside the box at which row and column intersect, one …rm’s pro…t matching this
combination of prices stands up to the left and the other …rm’s pro…t stands down to the right.
Round SimRand SeqRand TrSeqRand























































































































































Table 7: Summary of experimental results: Median (left) and mean (right) of individual prices per
round. (Only relevant prices for second movers in Treatment SeqRand.)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Round SimFix SeqFix TrSeqfix























































































































































Table 8: Summary of experimental results: Median (left) and mean (right) of individual prices per
round. (Only relevant prices for second movers in treatment TrSeqFix.)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
